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Purpose: To examine the effect of individual versus group evaluation and reward systems onwork group behavior
and performance under different task conditions.
Methodology:Uses computational social methods using Agent BasedModels to simulate work group interactions
as different forms of iterated games.
Findings:Group based systems outperform individual based andmixed systems, producingmore cooperative be-
havior, the best performing groups and individuals in most types of interaction games. A new role emerges, the
self-sacriﬁcer, who plays a critical role in enabling other groupmembers and the group, to performbetter at their
own expense.
Research Implications: Suggest opportunities for model development and guidelines for designing real world ex-
periments.
Practical Implications:Helps ﬁrms engineer better performingwork groups aswell as the design of other business
systems.
Social Implications: Identiﬁes mechanisms by which cooperation can be developed in social systems.
Originality/Value: Demonstrates the role and value of computational social science methods and agent based
models to business research.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Much of the work of ﬁrms is carried out using work groups or teams
of interacting individuals, such as in production processes, the develop-
ment of products and services, service delivery and in managing opera-
tions (Cummings, 2004; de Jong, de Ruyter, &Wetzels, 2005; Kozlowski
& Ilgen, 2006). As onemanager comments: ‘We think everythingworth
doing is done by groups, not by individuals’ (Weber, Holmes, & Palermi,
2005, p. 80). Prior research shows that cooperative behavior among
work group members plays an important role with more cooperative
groups outperforming less cooperative ones (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003).
Useful as such studies are, they tell us little about how and why
cooperative behavior emerges and continues in work groups and how
managers can engineer greater cooperation. As Kozlowski and Ilgen
(2006) conclude, based on an extensive review of the literature, “the
dynamics inherent in team processes are still somewhat elusive” (p 97).
Developing cooperative behavior in work groups is not easy because of
conﬂicts between individual and group interests. This is especially so when
groups comprise individuals with different backgrounds, expertise and
interests. Such groups tend not to share information, not to learn from each
other or to beﬂexible in termsof theirworkloads (Gratton&Erickson, 2007).
More generally, the evolution of cooperation in society, especially
among strangers and anonymous opponents is still an unresolved issue
(Hammerstein, 2003). Research shows that in general people show high
levels of cooperative and pro-social, behavior towards others, even to
strangers and anonymous others (e.g. Henrich et al., 2001). This is true of
primitive societies and societies with large scale institutions such asmarket in-
tegration andworld religions (Henrich et al., 2010;Woodside & Zhang, 2013).
Managers have several ways of potentially improving work group
cooperation and performance. One method is to use group or team
rewards but “despite hundreds of studies examining team rewards,
the conditions under which team rewards will be effective are unclear”
(Aimea, Meyer, & Humphrey, 2010, p 60). Prior research focuses on the
moderating effect of task interdependence and the rewards for cooper-
ation versus competition (Aimea et al., 2010; Chan, Li, & Pierce, 2014).
For example,Wageman (1995) shows that team effectiveness is highest
in work groups in which the rewards and tasks have pure individual
designs – those in which individual rewards and performance are
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independent of the performance other groupmembers – or pure group
designs, where individual rewards and performance of groupmembers
are completely interdependent such that the performance and rewards
of onemember entirely depends on the others’ performance. Chan et al.
(2014) show that team based rewards enhance performance when
worker ability is heterogeneous,whichmakes cooperationmore impor-
tant in completing tasks. The problem is that group tasks are usually a
mix of group and individual interests, a mixture of cooperative and
competitive incentives, which leads to the central research question
considered here: For what types of group tasks do group or team
based rewards outperform individual based rewards?
Computational social science methods can help answer this question.
They involve developing agent based computer simulation models that
mimic key features of the behavior of work groups and their interactions
(Epstein, 2006; Macy & Willer, 2002). The potential value of such
methods to studying work group design and performance has been
noted before: “Agent-based models have enormous potential to resolve
the problemof system-teamdesign… The high potential of this approach
means that it merits much broader attention and application in organiza-
tion teamdesign”Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006, p. 102) and in the examples
of the use of such models to study organizations including that by Chang
and Harrington (2006) and Prietula, Carley, and Gasser (1998).
Modeling the complex system of interactions among many individ-
uals that characterize work groups is beyond the scope of traditional
mathematical and statistical methods (Deissenberg, van der Hoog, &
Dawid, 2008; Leombruni & Richiardi, 2005). This is because work
groups are highly nonlinear systems in which group behavior and per-
formance emerges through the interactions taking place over time in a
bottom up self-organizing manner in a particular context, including
the task and themix of participants’ skills, knowledge, attitudes, predis-
positions and strategies (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). Instead, the study
andunderstanding of the behavior of complex systems likework groups
calls for a different approach to science to the traditional experimental
and mathematical methods that have served us well for the last
300 years (Jackson, 1996). Axelrod (1997) describes this approach as
a third way of doing science.
To build and analyze computational models requires new types of
skills, including programming and algorithmic thinking andways of un-
derstanding that challenge traditional ways of thinking and doing re-
search (Jacobson & Wilensky, 2006). Hence they tend to be resisted,
currently, in many social science and business disciplines research
using these methods is difﬁcult to publish (Harrison, Lin, Carroll, &
Carley, 2007). But the situation is changing, with articles explaining
and using these methods now appearing in top journals (e.g.
Goldenberg, Libai, & Muller, 2001; Lazer & Friedman, 2007; Macy &
Willer, 2002; Rand & Rust, 2011; Trusov, Rand, & Joshi, 2013), and
special issues of journals have been devoted to the subject, such as the
Journal of Business Research (Gilbert, Wander, Deffant, & Adjali, 2007),
Journal of Product Innovation and Management (Garcia & Jager, 2011),
International Journal of Innovation and Technology Management
(Siebers & Wilkinson, 2013) and Australasian Marketing Journal (D’
Alessandro & Winzar, 2014).
Computational models are a form of mathematical model written in
computer code. Just like any model they represent simpliﬁcations in
order to focus attention on key aspects of behavior. The major advan-
tage of using them is their ability to model and analyze the behavior
of complex nonlinear systems, involving many types of interactions
and interdependencies. The modeler does not need to make restrictive
assumptions in order to make a model mathematically tractable
(Tesfatsion & Judd, 2006). The outcomes of computational models are
studied using systematic computational experiments, rather than alge-
braic methods, to determine the logical outcomes of a model under
different conditions. Such outcomes can be counterintuitive, because
they are complex, nonlinear models (Tesfatsion & Judd, 2006) and
because, as LordMay (1976) notes, the education and training of people
and researchers is primarily on a diet of linear models.
Examples of the counterintuitive results of even relatively simple
nonlinear models include Axelrod’s (1984) computer experiments re-
garding the emergence of cooperation in Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma
games, as will be discussed in more detail later. Similarly Schelling’s
(1971) classic models of urban segregation, in which he showed that
even in the absence of any color prejudice, segregated neighborhoods
emerge over time in cities.
An alternative to building computational models is to study the be-
havior and performance emerging in real work groups under different
conditions, or to conduct experiments. But the former restricts research
to the studywork groups under conditions that exist and the researcher
can gain access to which does not include all the types of potential con-
ditions that could exist. And the latter requires a very large number of
experiments that would be impossible, too costly or unethical to carry
out in the realworld. But such experiments can be done using computer
models (Axelrod, 1997; Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005; Gilbert et al., 2007;
Tesfatsion & Judd, 2006). Furthermore, the outcomes of such computer
experiments complement empirical research because they can identify
likely conditions producing desired outcomes, which can then be tested
in the real world (Held, Wilkinson, Young, & Marks, 2014).
Research already exists which uses computational methods rele-
vant to the study of work group behavior. Axelrod (1984, 1987,
1997) and Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) undertook important
pioneering work using computational methods to study the evolu-
tion of cooperation and performance among interacting individuals.
They did this using Iterated Prisoner Dilemma (IPD) games to model
interactions involving a mix of competitive and cooperative mo-
tives. Their computer experiments provide the basis for the research
described here, which models work group interactions as forms of
interaction games. The research described here builds on and ex-
tends the work of Axelrod and his colleagues in many ways, includ-
ing using examples of all types of games, not just the IPD and to
examine the impact of group as well as individual evaluation and re-
ward systems on the emergence of cooperation.
The ﬁndings show that group based evaluation and reward systems
outperform individual based or mixed reward systems for a large num-
ber of group situations. Individual based systems outperform group and
mixed systems only when individual and group interests are aligned,
that is when the action that beneﬁts an individual also beneﬁts the
group. The ﬁndings are consistent with empirical research that shows
that the group task is an important moderator of the effect of group co-
hesion and shared knowledge and cognitions on group effectiveness
(Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). These conditions aid coordination and
the cooperation processes within groups when the group task is more
complex and greater interdependencies exist. In such situations more
opportunities for conﬂicts of interest arise such that group and individual
performance are not aligned.
The ﬁndings also reveal the conditions under which no signiﬁcant
difference between the outcomes of group and individual evaluation
and reward systems exist. This will help managers to identify and
focus attention on work group situations where the design of the
reward system matters.
Another ﬁnding is that, counter-intuitively, group incentives pro-
duce the highest performing individual strategies in many types of
games because they produce and sustain better mixes or ecologies of
strategies. As in biology, the success of a given type of animal’s behavior
strategy does not depend only on itself but also on the behavior of other
animals and their interactionswith them, aswell as on the environment
in which they operate.
Lastly, the ﬁndings suggest the existence of a new type of role in
work groups, the self-sacriﬁcer. These individuals induce superior per-
formance in others in the group and the group as awhole at the expense
of their own performance. They resemble but are quite different from
free-riders, who simply exploit the group for their own beneﬁt. Individ-
ualist evaluation and reward systems do not reward and retain self-
sacriﬁcers in groups. Instead, they are poorly evaluated and removed
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from the group or they are induced to change their behavior in ways
that are likely to harm group performance.
These research results have important implications for researchers
and managers in designing and implementing evaluation and reward
systems. For example, for researchers they point to key types of real
world experiments that need to be conducted to test the effects of eval-
uation and reward schemes on group behavior and performance. This
includes the need to allow for group interaction effects which is not
the norm - see for example research on sales teams by Lim, Ahearne,
and Ham (2009). The results can also help guide managers in designing
reward systems for different types of work group conditions.
The next section reviews research concerning the evolution of
cooperation, introduces theories of group selection and relates them
to cooperation in, and the performance of, work groups. The following
sections describe the model of work group interactions and perfor-
mance, the analytical methods and the ﬁndings. The concluding section
discusses the research and management implications of the results.
2. The evolution of cooperation and performance
As already noted, Axelrod and Hamilton conducted pioneering re-
search studying the evolution of cooperation and performance among
individuals using two-person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) games
(Axelrod 1984, 1987, 1997; Axelrod and Hamilton (1981)). The Pris-
oners’ Dilemma (PD) is a game in which two players have to decide
whether to cooperate (C) or defect (D) (not cooperate) with each
other, with the performance or payoff for each player dependent on
both their own and their partner’s choices. The game is used extensively
to study individual interactions in many situations because the game
has incentives to both cooperate and compete - see for example
Kendall, Yao & Chong, 2007; McNamara, Barta, & Houston, 2004 and
Stephens, McLinn, & Stevens, 2002. If both players cooperate they do
equally well, but if one cooperates and the other defects the defector
gets a greater payoff and the defector gets the worst possible payoff of
the game. If they both defect they each do badly but better than if
they cooperated and the other defected. In a one-time interaction the
best strategy is to defect, not cooperate, to avoid theworst possible pay-
off. In an iterated game, these payoffs accumulate over successive inter-
actions making the best strategy unclear. Axelrod and his colleagues
showed that a simple cooperative strategy, Tit for Tat, or some variant
of the strategy, resulted in the best overall performance. This strategy
begins by cooperating and then does what the other player does in
the previous interaction.
In a work group context group members interact with each other
and the results or payoffs may be interpreted as the performance of an
individual in such interactions, such as the number of units produced
or the number of tasks completed per period. Individual performance
depends on the actions of others in the group.
An example of an Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) type work
group situation is when a team faces pooled task interdependence
(Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976). This is
where workers have common tasks and inputs, like sharing the use of
equipment and/or space that has to be maintained and cleaned up
each period. To illustrate how this can be modeled as a PD game,
suppose that if bothworkers cooperate in a period (CC) 5 units of output
are produced by each. But if one decides to not cooperate (defect), such
as by shirking on the common tasks, and exploits the cooperative
behavior of another (DC or CD), who does all the common tasks, the
defector’s output increases at the expense of the cooperator. Say the
defector’s output increases to seven units and the cooperator now
produces only two units, this means that total output is reduced to
7 units (5 + 2). In other words the defector’s gain outweighs the coop-
erators loss of output. If both workers refuse to cooperate (DD) they
each produce less, say 3 units each, because common tasks are not
done by anyone or done very poorly. This is not as bad for an individual
compared to the case where they cooperate and the other defects but
this behavior results in the lowest possible total output.
This situation resembles the relationship between shifts in a soup fac-
tory described by Katzenbach and Khan (2010). In that case individual
shifts shirked (defected) on tasks such as cleaning and preparing
the work space for the next shift, which improved the ﬁrst shifts output
at the expense of the next. Overall performance suffered due to this
behavior and was only improved when new performance metrics and
communication and feedback systems were introduced that rewarded
total performance, rather the output of individual shifts. The result was
due to the emergence ofmore cooperative behavior and improvedmorale.
The research conducted by Axelrod and his colleagues focused on
the behavior and performance of individuals rather than groups and
on one type of interaction situation the IPD. Subsequent research also
follows this pattern, with group level effects largely overlooked except
for a few exceptions. Axelrod (1987) considered these effects in terms
of spatial models, whilst Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz (2004) show
how the existence of certain types of group level structuresmay encour-
age the evolution of group beneﬁcial traits. Similarly, Matros (2012)
found that altruism may survive in groups, although this is dependent
on the decision rules of those involved. Empirical work aimed at
improving group performance also focuses mainly on the individual,
without taking into account the group context, the team as a collective
actor, or the roles and contributions of individuals to team processes
and performances (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006).
The potential relevance and importance of group level effects is
reﬂected in evolutionary theories of group selection, which have been
applied to social systems (Henrich, 2004; Wilson & Gowdy, 2013).
Group selection theories recognize that animals and people do not in-
teract randomly with each other but form groups or ecologies involving
interactions among different types of actors (animals and plants) that
affect individual and group performance and survival. Work groups
are an example of this.
A dramatic illustration of the power of group selection is provided by
an experiment seeking to improve egg production. In this case the work
groups are battery hens whose reproduction is managed by farmers.
Selective breeding of the hens raised in cages that lay the most eggs is
the way farmers usually operate, which results in birds that lay more
eggs but who are very aggressive to each other, have reduced life spans
and produce lower quality eggs. But an experiment by Muir (1996)
showed that selective breeding of the best performing cages or groups
of hens, rather than individuals, results in even more eggs of a better
quality and hens with normal life spans who get on well with each
other. He has since shown that similar results occur in other types of
animal and plant communities (Muir, 2005). His results have led others
to reexamine theories of cooperation in animal and social systems, for
example see research by Henrich, 2004 andWilson & Sober, 1994).
Parallels exist with the design and management of work groups.
Most evaluation and reward systems in organizations follow the logic
of individual selection; they focus on the performance of the individual
and not the group (Ilgen & Sheppard, 2001). This encourages individ-
uals to behave in ways that increase their own performance at the
expense of the group’s, to the extent these two conﬂict (Kozlowski &
Ilgen, 2006). Theories of group selection point to the potential impor-
tance of group level evaluation and reward systems, which can encour-
age more cooperative behavior and potentially better work group
performance (Arya, Fellingham, & Glover, 1997; Che & Yoo, 2001;
FitzRoy & Kraft, 1987).
But the link is not straight forward. Research shows that group in-
centive mechanisms may produce enhanced performance but this de-
pends on group conditions (FitzRoy & Kraft, 1995) and the design of
the incentive scheme. For example, Nalbantian and Schotter (1997)
show that relative performance schemes outperform target based
schemes. Also playing a role are: the interactions between group mem-
bers (Encinosa, Gaynor, & Rebitzer, 2007; Libby & Thorne, 2009); the
types of incentives (Lavy, 2002); previous reward systems (Johnson
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et al., 2006); job image (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005); types of groupmem-
bers (Goette, Huffman, & Meier, 2006); society and company norms
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002); individual personalities (Beersma et al.,
2003; Ellis et al., 2003); and the ability of individuals to hold up output
(Kvaløy & Olsen, 2012).
The risk of free riding and the inability to detect this behavior is often
cited as the main argument against group based incentives (see for
example Hamilton, Nickerson, & Owan, 2003). One possible solution is
the use of mixed incentive schemes, rewarding both individual and
group performance. Libby and Thorne (2009), however, show that
they may not be beneﬁcial as they can confuse employees.
The complexity of the relationship between the problem setting and
performance makes drawing conclusions regarding the applicability of
group incentive systems difﬁcult. A number of factors are in play over
time, probable lags between incentives and performance and long
term performance matters. As noted already, empirical studies cannot
consider all the factors involved because of limits to the empirical
evidence available and the time and costs involved of doing all the
experiments required. A way forward is to use computational social
science methods, the methodology used here. More speciﬁcally, the
research described here builds on and extends the classic research by
Axelrod and his colleagues to examine the conditions under which
group based incentive systems do and do not outperform individual
based incentive systems and mixed systems. The analysis considers
the results for a sample of all possible types of games, not just IPD, in
order to reﬂect a greater variety of potential interaction situations and
payoff structures that may be encountered in work groups. No previous
research has been found that systematically compares the impact of
group versus individual reward systems for all types of game conditions.
3. A computational model of work group interactions
This section describes an agent based computer simulationmodel in
which the agents are individuals with strategies for interacting with
others in groups under different work group situations. The agent
based model simulates interactions between pairs of individuals as dif-
ferent types of iterated games. The model uses two types of evaluation
and reward systems to form and change groups over time: 1) Group
Selection, which rewards the best performing groups by selecting
and retaining them; 2) Individual Selection, which rewards the best
performing individuals in groups by selecting and retaining them. The
model uses a genetic algorithm, a computational technique that mimics
natural selection, to represent the two types of evaluation and reward
systems, as explained below. In real groups individuals do not go
through the type of evolutionary process used in the simulations;
instead this is amechanism to determine equilibrium behavior in different
circumstances (Riechmann, 2001). As such, thismodel is normative, rather
than descriptive of the mechanism by which group selection occurs.
3.1. Selection and reward systems
Individuals interact within groups and the interactions take the form
of two-player, iterated, binary choice games in which players either
cooperate or defect (which means they do not cooperate). Individual
performance depends on what both players do and the speciﬁc form
of the interaction game played. Four possible types of interaction can
occur. Both players can cooperate and achieve the CC performance
outcome; if Player 1 defectswhilst Player 2 cooperates Player 1 achieves
the DC performance outcome; if Player 1 cooperates whilst Player 2
defects Player 1 achieves the CD performance outcome and if both
players defect they each achieve the DD performance outcome. Note
these games are symmetric, so if Player 1 achieves the CD performance
outcome by cooperating whilst Player 2 defects, then Player 2 achieves
theDCperformance outcome. The CC, CD, DC, DDnotation used through
the remainder of this paper indicates theway players perform in a given
interaction.
The population consists of n players divided into m groups, each of
equal size (n/m). In each generation every individual plays a speciﬁc
two-player game with every other individual within the group in turn.
Each interaction lasts for r rounds. The iterated games allow players to
condition their behavior on that of their partners and their previous
interactions with those partners. In this way they can try to punish or
reward others based on the way they behave. Arya et al. (1997) and
Che and Yoo (2001) both show that the ability to monitor and punish
opponents is potentially important in successfully employing group
reward schemes.
All members of the group interact equally frequently with all other
members in this model. However, this is not a necessary part of the
model. A network structure could be imposed on each group, which
would determine the frequency and nature of individual interactions.
The network could be determined endogenously (e.g. Fosco & Mengel,
2011) or players could select and refuse partners based on their
previous behavior, like the models of Ashlock, Smucker, Stanley, and
Tesfatsion (1996). Previous research shows that the structure of rela-
tions within a group or units within an organization can inﬂuence its
performance, see for example Cummings and Cross (2003) and Ethiraj
and Levinthal (2004). Here the model uses a simple stylized form of
group structure in order to separate and demonstrate the effect of the
reward and evaluation mechanism. The effect of more complex group
structures is an open question for further research.
Groups in this model represent teams of individuals interacting in a
company or similar setting. By modelling groups as a collection of indi-
viduals playing two-player games the model allows for a wide range of
strategic possibilities. Players may potentially exploit or assist other in-
dividualswithin the team tomaximize their own or group performance.
Their behavior depends on their own strategy and the strategy of each
individual with whom they interact. For example, one player’s strategy
may mean they try to exploit some members of the group for personal
gain but at the same time cooperatewith others who show a propensity
to retaliate. An alternative would be to consider n-player games, where
more than two players interact at the same time. This, however, con-
strains the scope of strategies and interactions because, in an n-player
game, players cannot respond in different ways to different players,
they can only act based on the sum of every player’s actions in the
previous period. This may be an interesting future extension of the
research.
Each individual’s strategy dictates how they play the game. A strate-
gy speciﬁes the player’s responses to all possible game situations. The
set of situations a playermay face is dependent on theirmemory length.
With two possible actions (cooperate and defect), and amemory length
of k, 2k possible game situations can occur that the playermust respond
to; that is the number of possible types of two period histories of behav-
ior. For example, Tit-for-Tat only responds to the behavior of the other
player in the previous period, which means the Tit-for-Tat player
remembers the behavior of the other player in the previous period
and responds accordingly. In this case the strategy has only two possible
histories to respond to - either the other player cooperated or defected
in theprevious period. If a player has amemory lengthof two, theplayer
responds to the previous two periods of the other’s behavior. This
means the strategy has four possible histories of the other’s actions to
contend with, which are: (D,D) where the other player defected in the
last two periods, they defected then cooperated (D,C), cooperated and
then defected (C,D) or cooperated both times (C,C). Note that, by
convention, behavior separated by commas in brackets describe past
behavior.
With a two period memory, a strategy must describe a player’s re-
sponses in the current period to all four possible two period histories.
An example is DCCC. In the notation used in themodel the D in position
one of the strategy indicates what the player does if the other defects in
the previous two periods (D, D). The C’s in positions two, three and four
indicate that the player will cooperate in the current period in all other
possible two period histories which are in order (C,D) (D,C) or (C,C)).
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The strategy is not complete because the player’s behavior at the
game’s beginning is not speciﬁed. At that point the strategy has no
two period history to respond to because they have not yet interacted.
To resolve this, a player’s strategy includes a ﬁctitious “memory” that
indicates how the playerwill behave in theﬁrst interactions, its opening
stance. A two period memory requires specifying a players behavior in
the ﬁrst two periods of interaction. By convention, the string describing
a strategy starts with these responses. Hence, a strategy string of
CC|DCCC comprises a ﬁctitious two period history of (C,C) in the ﬁrst
two positions followed by the rules of behavior for each of the four
possible two period histories (DCCC), as described above. These rules
of behavior also specify how the player responds to its ﬁctitious initial
two period “memory”. The ﬁctitious history memory is a kind of initial
orientation or attitude, the degree of cooperativeness or competitive-
ness a player brings to the game at the outset. For example, a player
with a ﬁctitious memory of (C,C) and the rules of behavior DCCC
cooperates in the initial period. In the next period, the player has a
one period realmemory ofwhat the other player did in the initial period
and replaces the ﬁctitious memory. The initial ﬁctitious memory of
behavior in the previous period now moves to become the ﬁctitious
memory of two periods ago. For example, if the other player defected
in the ﬁrst period, in the following period the two period memory
changes from (C,C) to (C,D). The remainder of the strategy string,
DCCC, indicates the player will still cooperate in the following period.
After period three is the strategy has a real two period history and the
ﬁctitious memory no longer affects the player’s behavior. From then
on a player’s behavior depends only on its actual two period memory
of what the other player did, which a player updates after each period.
With a three period memory, a strategy has eight possible three period
histories to contend with, plus an initial ﬁctitious memory of three
periods, for example (DCC|DCDCCDCC).More generally, with amemory
length of k, a strategy has 2k possible k period histories to contend and
the strategy must specify responses to each of them plus k periods of
ﬁctitious memory.
A genetic algorithm (Holland, 1975) models the evaluation and
reward systems, which optimize strategies in a similar manner to
Axelrod (1987) and Midgley, Marks, and Cooper (1997). At the start of
the simulation, individual strategies in groups are randomly generated.
Time proceeds in generations. In each generation each individual plays
all other individuals in their group a ﬁxed number of times or iterations.
An individual’s total performance is the sum of its performance from all
the iterated games played against all other members of the individual’s
group. The group’s overall performance is the sum of the performances
of all players within a group. After calculating performance the algo-
rithm determines the next generation of players from the existing pop-
ulation. Individual selection focuses on the high performing individuals,
whilst group selection focuses on the high performing groups. Retention
is both direct, by keeping high performing individuals and groups and
their strategies in the next generation and indirect, by creating new in-
dividuals and groups from existing high performing behavior strategies.
Direct retention guarantees the best performing strategies survive
whilst the indirect method allows improvement. Under individual
selection the best performing individuals are the n/2 individuals in the
population with the highest performance. The genetic algorithm (GA)
inserts these individuals into random groups in the next generation
(direct retention). The algorithm also forms new strategies by randomly
choosing pairs of the best performing individuals and creating a new
strategy (indirect selection) by combining the ﬁrst part of one strategy
with the second part of the other (a technique known as “crossover”).
The GA chooses the break or crossover point randomly from a uniform
distribution. To illustrate the procedure, suppose the ﬁrst individual
selected has the two period memory strategy of CD|DCDD, the second
has DC|DDCC and the randomly chosen crossover position is 4. The
newly created strategy is CD|DCCC,which combines the ﬁrst 4 elements
of the ﬁrst individual’s strategy and the last 2 elements of the second. In
biology crossover mimics reproduction, whilst in social systems
crossover can be thought of as a form of learning and sharing of strate-
gies within a population. After crossover, a small probability (5%) exists
for a single point mutation in a strategy in which a D ﬂips to C or vice
versa, which, in social systems, may be thought of as errors in copying
another’s style of behavior. Next the GA randomly allocates the n/2
new individuals to groups.
Under group selection the GA selects the m/2 best performing
groups and inserts them into the next generation (direct retention).
The GA forms the remaining groups by combining pairs of individuals
selected from the best performing groups at random, irrespective of
their individual performance (indirect retention). As with individual
selection, a single point mutation occurs with a 5% probability.
The GA identiﬁes an equilibrium, that is a population of strategies
maximizing performance for the given selection mechanism. The GA
repeats the process for 1000 generations. Convergence, deﬁned as
group and individual performance being on average constant, occurs
relatively early, typically after 100 generations. Games are played for
r = 200 rounds. Examining different numbers of rounds reveals no
effect on the results. The population size is n = 64, whilst the number
of groups is m = 8. The memory length is k = 3. Simulations with
different population sizes and memory lengths are not qualitatively
different and are available from the authors on request. Different
group sizes have a small effect on the results, primarily for groups of
size two. The two group case does not have many of the interaction
effects, as each player only ever plays one other. As a consequence the
population behaves like one large group. For larger group sizes the
results are qualitatively similar.
In any computational experiment veriﬁcation and validation of the
algorithm are important to ensure accuracy and reliability of results.
In this case both the game set up and theGA are standard computational
tools, which simpliﬁes the analysis. All of the components of themodel,
were tested individually. A test of the mechanism by which individuals
play compared the computed results to those calculated by hand for a
sample of games and strategies to ensure the two were identical. The
GA was tested in stages. Sample populations were subjected to the
group and individual based selection mechanisms and the resulting
populations analyzed to ensure that the observed behavior matched
that speciﬁed above. The occurrence of mutations and crossovers were
observed and compared to the parameters specifying their frequency
to verify they matched. Further, none of the parameters controlling
the GA - the probability of mutations (errors), the probability of cross-
overs and the number of crossovers qualitatively affected the results
showing that the exact speciﬁcation of the genetic algorithm is not
responsible for the ﬁndings. The code for the simulations is available
in the journal repository.
4. Results
To determine the conditions in which individual or group selection
is superior, a broad range of games were considered. Rapoport and
Guyer (1966) identify 726 strategically distinct 2 by 2 games in which
individuals have different rankings of performances, reﬂecting different
types of interaction situations. In this model the absolute values of the
performances matter, the actual amount of payoff, rather than simply
their ordering, in determining strategy success. This is because an indi-
vidual’s performance is the sum of the performances over the repeated
interactions of the game against all group members. Consequently, an
inﬁnite number of possible games exist, making an exhaustive analysis
impossible. In order to bound the analysis a sample is drawn from the
space of all possible games and integer multiples of 0.1 in the range
[0,1] deﬁne performance outcomes. An example of a game is where
the payoffs for each player are CC = 0.5, DC = 0.7, CD = 0.1, DD =
0.2. This means that when both players cooperate their performance is
each 0.5 and is the maximum possible combined performance of 1 in
this game. When a player defects and the other cooperates the defec-
tor’s performance is 0.7 and the cooperator’s is 0.1 for a combined 0.8.
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When both defect the performance of both players is 0.2 and the com-
bined total is 0.4. The resulting number of games in the simulations is
14,641 including all possible rank orderings of performance. This
means that theﬁgures summarizing the results in the following sections
are necessarily dense because they derive from so many thousands of
individual simulation runs. Some games cannot be represented in this
format, for instance games that would produce lexicographic prefer-
ences - those inwhich the payoff for a single instance of a particular out-
come exceed the sum of outcomes for any other action across all rounds
of the game. Nevertheless, this set is substantial and sufﬁcient for the
analysis both in terms of its breadth and detail.
4.1. Group versus individual selection and reward
Figs. 1 and 2 show the selection and reward mechanisms producing
the best group and individual performance for the range of games de-
scribed above. A white cell corresponds to games where no differences
exist between group and individual evaluation and reward mecha-
nisms, black cells to those where group selection produces higher
performance and grey cells when individual selection produces higher
performance. The results of each simulation of a game vary depending
on the random seed used, which affects the starting conditions, the
outcomes of the genetic algorithm and mutations. For this reason
simulations were repeated 1000 times for group selection and individ-
ual selection for each game, leading to a sample of results in each case.
The analysis of results focused on mean differences signiﬁcant at the
99% level. These results are presented in Fig. 1. In all panels the perfor-
mances for different values of CD and DC, which are the rewards given
to players cooperatingwhen the other defects and those given to defec-
torswhen the other cooperates, vary along the x and y axis respectively.
Each panel represents different values of DD performance as indicated
and all the panels have the CC performance set at 0.5. Analysis of the
results for different values of CC are qualitatively similar and available
on request.
Differences exist between the outcomes of individual and group
selection mechanisms. Fig. 1 shows distinct areas within which one of
the two selection mechanisms produces signiﬁcantly better performing
groups. Areas also exist where the results show no signiﬁcant differ-
ences between the two mechanisms. The black area in which group
selection performs better, is much larger than the grey areas where
individual selection performs best.
Whilst the black area appears to be contiguous, the area comprises
several distinct sub-regions, reﬂecting different types of games. The
ﬁrst is the area bounded by DD ≤ 0.5 and CD + DC N 1.0, the triangle
in the upper right that is most clearly identiﬁable in the sub ﬁgure for
DD = 0.5. In these games the highest combined performance is from
anti-coordination, in other words playing C when your partner plays D
or vice versa. Consider for example the game inwhich the performances
are CC= 0.5, DC= 0.8, CD= 0.4, DD= 0.0. The best combined perfor-
mance in this case is if one individual cooperates and the other defects
because the combination of DC and CDproduce 1.2 units of performance
whereas the CC/CC and DD/DD combinations produce 1.0 and 0.0
respectively. The defector’s individual performance is much better
than the cooperator’s. Under individual selection this will lead to an
increase in the number of defectors and therefore more DD interactions
within the population, which reduces group performance. In this game
situation group selection selects the optimal mix of cooperators and
defectors to ensuremore CD/DC interactions thatmaximize performance.
This type of game resembles simple or modular coordination tasks or
sequential task dependence (Thompson, 1967) in which individuals
specialize in different sub-tasks that can be assembled or added together,
as when groups of workers take turns in digging a hole, recording results,
or serving different customers in a market (see for example the
experiments of Selten &Warglien, 2007 and Weber & Camerer, 2003).
The second segment is approximately bounded by DD ≤ 0.4, DC ≥ 0.5
and CD + DC b 1.0. This corresponds to the area of games in the upper
left of the ﬁrst ﬁve sub-ﬁgures and is contiguous with the region previ-
ously described. In this area, mutual cooperation produces the highest
combined performance but defection against a cooperator produces a
Fig. 1.Best performing groups: comparison of group and individual selection and rewardmechanisms.*. *Simulations results for best groupperformance in theﬁnal generation for different
interaction games. In all cases CC= 0.5, different values of CD on the x-axis, DC on the y-axis and DD across panels. 1000 repetitions conducted for each game, and selection and reward
mechanism. White squares correspond to no signiﬁcant difference in scores. Black squares are games in which group selection produces superior results and grey squares are those in
which individual selection is superior. In all cases differences are signiﬁcant at the 99% level.
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higher individual performance. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game exists in
this segment. Like the area discussed above, individual selection re-
wards those players who defect as they increase their individual score
at the expense of the group’s performance. Group selection allows the
population to settle on an equilibrium that is beneﬁcial to all. The per-
formance favors those whomutually cooperate and group selection en-
courages the existence of these strategies. The ﬁnal area in which group
selection is superior is the triangle bounded by DD N 0.5, DC b 0.5,
CD N 0.5 (the bottom right in those ﬁgures for DD N 0.5), where the com-
bined performance for DD is the same or more than CD/DC and more
than CC. This is equivalent to the ﬁrst region except that the perfor-
mance matrix is mirrored, with DD being the equivalent of CC. Hence
the explanation is similar. The best performing groups contain the
most defectors but if CD is less than DC and CD is greater than CC, indi-
vidual selection will favor the cooperator, which moves the groups
away from mutual defection.
Individual selection does better for a range of games in the bottom
left of the sub-ﬁgures. In order to maximize group performance all
players must synchronize on either CC or DD, depending on which is
higher. The CD and DC scores are such that if an individual changes
strategy when in the lower performing equilibrium, they reduce their
own performance but this reduces the group’s performance by even
more. For example, for the game in which CC = 0.5, CD = 0.3, DC =
0.0 and DD = 0.4 a single co-operator in a group of defectors receives
0.3 every time they play and their opponent’s performance is 0.0. For
CC = 0.5, when DD is between 0.4 and 0.7, the pure CC and DD perfor-
mances are sufﬁciently similar that the optimization method may
initially identify either. The actual choice will depend on the random
distribution of strategies at the start of the model. Under group selec-
tion, the sub-optimal strategy is very hard to change if a population
synchronizes on such a strategy. A single player changing will reduce
the group performance, even though the individual’s performance is
increased, leading to the group not being selected. Under individual
selection the change in strategy increases the individual’s performance,
leading to their selection and their behavior spreading in the population
and, in time, the whole population adopts the superior strategy. Note
that for DD = 0.5 both DD and CC are equally good and so switching
is not necessary. In other words group and individual performance
incentives are aligned such that what is good for group performance is
equally good for the individual and vice versa.
The overall pattern of results is that group selection does better than
individual selection when individual and group performance incentives
are not aligned. To achieve the optimal performance some individuals
must sacriﬁce their own performance for the good of the group as a
whole. A Pareto optimum occurs when those who sacriﬁce their own
performance for the greater returns to the group as awhole can be com-
pensated. These self-sacriﬁcers, hence play an important role in groups
in these situations but are quickly eliminated from the population under
individual selection. This is a novel ﬁnding as the role and importance of
such self-sacriﬁcers and the way they affect group performance has not
been identiﬁed and discussed before. Thisﬁnding raises issues as to how
and when managers can identify and nurture such behavior and the
conditions in which they are valuable.
A large range of games exist for which the two mechanisms do
equally well. In these areas both individual and group selection are
able to ﬁnd strategies that are equally effective. This means that, in
work groups conforming to these patterns of behavior interdepen-
dencies, the types of incentive and reward systems used do not matter,
which helps focus the attention of managers on the types of groups in
which they do matter.
Fig. 2 shows that group selection produces the best performing indi-
vidual in nearly half of all games. This is surprising because the individ-
ual based selection mechanism is designed to maximize this quantity.
The ranges in which this is true closely match those in which group
selection also produces the best performing groups. The conditions
that lead to high group performance also produce the best individual
performance. This is because, under group selection, the mix of strate-
gies in the group that produces the best individual performance
Fig. 2. Highest performing individual performance: comparison of group and individual selection and reward mechanisms.*. * Simulations results for best individual performance in the
ﬁnal generation for different interaction games. In all cases CC=0.5, different values of CD on the x-axis, DC on the y-axis and DD across panels. 1000 repetitions conducted for each game
and selection mechanism. White squares correspond to no signiﬁcant difference in performance. Black squares are games in which group selection produces superior results and grey
squares are those in which individual selection is superior. In all cases differences are signiﬁcant at the 99% level.
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survives, whereas under individual selection the high performing
individual strategies will spread among groups and reduce overall
performance as they compete more against each other.
Not only does group selection produce the best performing individ-
uals overall, group selection also produces in many cases the worst
overall performing individuals. This is not shown in the ﬁgure. These
are the aforementioned self-sacriﬁcers in groups, whose poor perfor-
mance helps increase group performance. Theseworst poor performers
are essential to the superior functioning of the group because they en-
able others in the group to perform much better as well as the group
as a whole. Individual selection eliminates such individuals, whereas
group selection does not.
The worst performing individuals are not always self-sacriﬁcers -
those individuals which boost the performance of the group at their
own expense. Self-sacriﬁcers can only exist when superior group per-
formance requires a particular mix of cooperation and defection and,
when self-sacriﬁcers interact with each other they do not perform so
poorly as to offset the increase in the performance of others in the
group. When all individuals have to cooperate (or defect in some
games) to produce superior group performance this results in no
differences in the performance of each individual and hence no self-
sacriﬁcers. For example, the PD game described earlier, where CC =
0.5, CD=0.1, DC= 0.7 and DD=0.2, produces the best performing in-
dividuals under group selection and groupmembers score 0.5 each time
from cooperating. Individual selection produces the worst performing
individuals who score 0.2 per round.
Self-sacriﬁcers emerge when group selection produces an equal mix
of co-operators and defectors. In general, for large groups thiswill be the
case if: CD + CC + DC + DD N 4 max(CC,DD). In this case the payoffs
from the mixed strategy (cooperating with defectors) compensate for
the times when players end up cooperating with cooperators and
defecting with defectors. For example, in the PD game where CD =
0.1, CC = 0.5, DC = 0.7 and DD = 0.2 the sum of all the payoffs is
0.1 + 0.5 + 0.7 + 0.2 = 1.5, which is not greater than 4 times the
maximum of 0.2 and 0.5. So, in this case group selection produces
pure CC strategies.
If the game instead is: CC = 0.5, CD = 0.4, DC = 1.0 and DD=0.2,
the sum of all payoffs 0.4 + 0.5 + 1.0 + 0.2 = 2.1 and is greater than
4 times the maximum of 0.2 and 0.5. In this case group selections pro-
duces a mixed strategy that includes self-sacriﬁcers, who cooperate,
which assists defectors in producing 1.0 each interaction with them,
whilst they produce 0.5.
Now consider individual selection. This produces the best performing
individual in the set of games for which CD = DC and CD N 0.5 and
DC N 0.5. Here, the CD/DC option results in the greatest individual perfor-
mance. Within this region individual performances are maximized by
being in theminority in the group. The regular mixing of individuals oc-
casionally allocates a defector to a group of cooperators, or a cooperator
to a group of defectors in some games. This results in high individual per-
formance but a low group performance (Fig. 1). Off this diagonal an ad-
vantage exists for either one action or the other. In these regions the
ability to maintain a better group composition provided by group selec-
tion outweighs the selection beneﬁts of individual selection, leading to
higher individual performance. A second area in which individual selec-
tion does better is the small light gray triangle in the region DD ≤ 0.4,
CD+ DC b 1.0 and CD N 0.5. In this region individual selection does par-
ticularly well because of the noise introduced by the selection process.
Occasionally, mutations lead to individuals who defect. Defection in
these games damages the defectors’ performance but gives small in-
creases to others in the group. As a result, the presence of one of these in-
dividuals leads to the group containing the best performing individual in
the population. At the same time the group’s overall score is reduced,
meaning that they are not the highest performing group. Other instances
exist where individual selection produces the best performing individual
overall, although the areas in which this occurs are somewhat diffuse.
The reason for this is that when a particular combination of strategies
results in a higher performing individual, this individual’s behavior
spreads throughout the group and their performance is reduced. Conse-
quently, the performance of the best individual is partially dependent on
timing and the games that they are in appear to have little pattern.
4.2. Strategies emerging
In order to better understand the behavior of players under the two
selection and reward mechanisms, consider the player strategies in a
sample game. Table 1 shows the set of strategies present in the
1000th generation for a version of the Prisoners Dilemma with perfor-
mances CC = 0.5, CD = 0.1, DC = 0.7 and DD = 0.2. Each cell of
Table 1 gives the fraction of individuals who cooperate in that location
of their strategy. The ﬁrst three columns are the three period ﬁctitious
history, labeled Ht-3, Ht-2 and Ht-1, whilst the next eight columns indi-
cate whether the strategy cooperates of defects to each possible three
period history. A Z-test and a signiﬁcance at the 99% level was used to
test for difference in the proportions cooperating between the two
selection mechanisms. An asterix indicates signiﬁcant differences.
Table 1 shows no dominant strategy, unlike the results found by
Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), instead a mix of strategies result in
high performance. A single dominant strategy exists if all entries in
the table, are either 0% or 100%. A mix of strategies emerges because
different strategies can produce the same pattern of behavior. For
instance, against a player who always cooperates, a strategy that defects
in response to a partner’s defection results in the same behavior as does
the strategy of a habitual cooperator, despite possessing different
response rules. The potential defector is never induced to defect and
the habitual cooperator always cooperates and thus only cooperative
behavior is seen. In biological terms the strategies have different geno-
types but the same phenotype, which corresponds to the difference
between latent and observed behavior in social systems. As a result
cooperative behavior may occur even when the strategies involved
include non-cooperative rules, if these rules are not activated. The
types of strategies produced by group selection and individual selection
differ noticeably, with group selection strategies having the following
characteristics compared to individual selection strategies:
4.2.1. Think nice
Comparison of the ﬁctitious history, positions Ht-3, Ht-2 and Ht-1 of
Table 1 shows more Cs. Group selection strategies commence the
game with a more cooperative predisposition, which is represented by
being more likely to assume a history of cooperation.
4.2.2. Act nice
In general, the strategies emerging from group selection are less
likely to defect in response to a given pattern of behavior than those
emerging from individual selection. In particular, in group selection
they are more likely to cooperate after three successive defections
(55.5% versus 30.8%), which avoids getting caught in inﬁnite cycles of
defection. Players are more likely to continue to cooperate when the
pattern is repeatedly cooperative, when a defection is followed by two
cooperations or three successive cooperations, and are more forgiving,
being more prepared to cooperate when the other cooperates after
two previous defections (58% versus 26.4%).
4.2.3. Provocable
Strategies emerging from group selection are not naive cooperators,
as they are just as likely as those emerging from individual selection to
retaliate once the other starts to defect, which is reﬂected in responses
to D,C,D and C,D,D.
Strategies from group selection have much in common with the
characteristics of successful strategies identiﬁed by Axelrod (1984) in
an IPD setting: nice, provocable, forgiving and clear.
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4.3. Hybrid section rules
The results in the previous section compared group and individual
selection. Whilst group selection appears to outperform individual
selection inmany circumstances, group sectionmaynot fully differentiate
between rewarding self-sacriﬁcing behavior (good) and rewarding free
riding behavior (bad). Free riders may survive in a group over extended
periods of time andhave anegative impact on groupperformance. For ex-
ample, van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden (2001) show experimen-
tally how the extra effort induced in some individuals by team based
rewards may be lost due free riders in the group. A variety of approaches
for dealing with this have been considered, including punishment
(Gachter & Fehr, 2000) and allowing individuals a say in who they inter-
act with (Page, Putterman, & Unel, 2005). An alternative is for ﬁrms to
mix group rewards that encourage cooperation with individual incen-
tives encouraging effort, although Libby and Thorne (2009) suggest that
such incentive systems may confuse agents, even though situations
exist in which they produce superior results. In the simulations group
and individual mechanisms differ in two important dimensions - the
way in which performance is calculated, either the individual or the
group scores, and the formation of groups. Group selection retains the
best performing groups in their entirety whilst individual selection does
not. Additional simulations were conducted to examine the effects of
differentmixes of group and individual selection. First, a two dimensional
space of selection schemes was developed, in which the weight given to
individual and group performance varies along one dimension and
degree of group mixing on the other. For the performance dimension
the performance of an individual Ui in a group k, is given by the following
formula:




Where Si is individual i’s performance and Gk the total performance
of group k, Gk/(n/m) is the average score of each member of the group,
the weight given to average group performance is α and the weight
given to individual performance is 1- α. Ui is therefore a mixture of in-
dividual and group performance controlled byα. The second dimension
is the degree of group mixing, β. With probability β, each individual
whose performance is greater than or equal to the population median
remains in the same group in the new generation. With probability
1 − β, they are moved to another group selected at random and
replaced by new individuals generated by mutation and crossover of
those individuals that survived the previous generation. Individuals
whose performance is below the population median are removed
from their groups and the population. This procedure means that if
β=0 the next population is randomlymixedwhilst if β=1 the popula-
tion structure is maintained with those individuals who performed less
than their group median replaced by new strategies. Simulations were
done for all combinations of α and β, where α, β ∈{0.0, 0.1…0.9, 1.0}.
If α= 1 and β= 1 the model matches group selection as presented in
the previous section, while if α= 0 and β= 0 the model corresponds
to individual selection. The simulations in each case were repeated 1000
times, the same as in the earlier simulations.
Fig. 3 shows the best performing individual and group scores for the
space of selection mechanisms averaged over all games, where CC, DC,
CD, DD ∈{0.0, 0.1,., 0.9, 1.0}. The results show that pure group selection
rulesmaximize individual performance. Hybrid rules do not enhance in-
dividual performance. Higher levels ofβ increase the best scores but this
effect is secondary to that of α. Group performance increases with both
α and β and the maximum occurs when α= 1 and β= 1. Pure group
selection on average produces better performing individuals and groups
than does either individual selection or hybrid rules. This shows that
both group based selection and a stable group mix contribute to this
effect.
Table 1
Probability of cooperating for strategies with memory length three in the ﬁnal generation under group and individual reward mechanisms.*.
Position Ht-3 Ht-2 Ht-1 (D,D,D) (D,D,C) (D,C,D) (D,C,C) (C,D,D) (C,D,C) (C,C,D) (C,C,C)
Group 61.9* 83.3* 88.7 55.5* 58.0* 48.8 84.1* 49.8 55.6* 54.1* 98.9*
Individual 54.1* 56.1* 86.0 30.8* 26.4* 53.4 67.0* 48.0 71.9* 62.3* 77.6*
*Results are for a PrisonersDilemma gamewith CC=0.5, CD=0.1, DC=0.7 andDD=0.2. First three cells contain the ﬁctitious historywhilst the remaining eight contain the percentage
of players’who cooperate in response to the observed history. For each entry if the difference in proportions cooperating under the two selection and rewardmechanismwas signiﬁcant at
the 99% level (based on a Z-test) they are indicated with a *.
a) Best Individual b) Best Group
Fig. 3. Best individual and group performance across the space of selection and reward mechanisms.*. *All results averaged over 14641 games for the best individual and group
performance in the ﬁnal generation of each simulation. The performance measure, α, ranging from 0.0 (individual based evaluation) to 1.0 (group based evaluation) is given on the
x-axis. The group mixing measure, β, ranging from 0.0 (random) to 1.0 (constant) is given on the y-axis. Lighter colours represent higher scores.
2420 D. Ladley et al. / Journal of Business Research 68 (2015) 2412–2425
The results shown in Fig. 3 show the overall pattern, which is similar
to the results of earlier analysis highlighting the types of games where
individual selection is superior. To examine this further consider the
effect of α and β on three speciﬁc games. The performance matrices
are shown in Table 2. For Game 1 (Prisoners Dilemma), the previous
results showed group selection produces both the best performing
individuals and groups. In Game 2 group selection produces the best
performing groups but individual selection produces the best individuals.
For Game 3 individual selection produces the best individuals and groups.
Fig. 4 shows the results for the three games under thedifferent selec-
tionmechanisms. For Game 1, the Prisoners Dilemma, the highest aver-
age performance occurs at high levels of α and any level of β. High α
means that the reward for individual performance is principally deter-
mined by the overall group performance, which rewards co-operators.
This being the case, β becomes unimportant – group structure being
maintained or new groups being formed from the successful co-
operators has no effect. The best individuals for these parameter combi-
nations also perform relatively better but they are outperformed by the
best individuals under high β and intermediate α. In this setting,
rewards for an individual are dependent on their own performance as
well as the group’s. If one individual in a group occasionally defects
they increase their own performance with relatively little effect on the
group reward component of their performance. This is only the case if
β is high. If population shufﬂing results in defectors coming together
they potentially perform very badly, damaging group performance.
In Game 2 individual selection produces the best performing indi-
viduals and group selection the best performing groups. As noted be-
fore, the highest individual performance occurs when a player is part
of a group in which the majority uses the opposite strategy and this
occurs more frequently under individual selection. The analysis of
α and β in Fig. 4 shows that both contribute to this effect. More popula-
tionmixing ensures that these chance pairings happenmore frequently
whilst an individual reward component means that high performing
individual strategies will spread in the population, changing the num-
bers of cooperators and defectors and making unbalanced groups
more likely. Panel D shows that the key element leading to better
performing groups under group selection is high β, that is, stable
group structure. In this game the highest performance is achieved
when cooperators play defectors in equal numbers. Stable groups are
better able to do this than those that are randomly mixed. Here α has
a weak effect, particularly at high β but for lower values of β, perfor-
mance decreases with increasing α – the same pattern observed for
the best performing individual.
The results for Game 3 show that β has very little effect on perfor-
mance and the apparent superiority of individual selection comes
from α. In other words, group structure is unimportant but individual
reward components are beneﬁcial. This follows from the justiﬁcation
provided above for superior individual performance in these games.
Individual based selection aids individuals, and therefore the popula-
tion, to move from inferior equilibria to superior ones. The results
show that this happens in response to only a small individual reward
component. Whether individuals are mixed or the population structure
is maintained has little effect on this.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Whilst prior research highlights the positive effect on performance
of cooperation within work groups and teams, little work considers
how to develop and maintain this cooperation. The results reported
here provide a systematic basis for understanding the conditions
under which work group based evaluation and reward systems lead to
higher group and individual performance relative to individually
oriented systems. The results show that group selection: a) produces
higher individual and group performance for a wider range of games
than does individual selection; b) dominates in games where group
and individual performances are not aligned; and c) leads to the emer-
gence and survival of groups of strategies in which some individuals
perform far better than others and the group as awhole performsbetter.
Individual selection only does better when group and individual perfor-
mance incentives are aligned. In other words when the best performing
strategy for an individual also produces the highest group performance,
as reﬂected in the sentimentwhat is good for GeneralMotors is good for
America! In this situation, unilateral deviation, in which one player
moves to a collectively lower but individually higher payoff, aids
group performance. This type of task is a pure individual design with
no interdependence among group members, tasks are performed
independently and do not depend on the performance of others. This
is in line with Wageman’s (1995) experiments with work groups,
which showed that independence can produce high performance.
Seldom, however, do group tasks have this characteristic. The use of
hybrid rules, those rewarding both individual and group performance,
does not change this key ﬁnding. The best performing groups and
individuals still occur when rewards are determined purely on group
performance and group structure is maintained.
The results have implications for the design of group tasks and
incentive schemes in ﬁrms and, by extension, they are relevant also
for the development of industries, business networks and regions
because they are groups of individual ﬁrms and other organizations.
First, the ﬁndings show the need to match incentive schemes with
group tasks and interconnectedwork ﬂows because this results in inter-
dependent individuals in the group. Identifying such group situations
requires a careful examination of the degree to which individual and
group performance is aligned. The degree of alignment reﬂects different
types of task interdependence, such as those described by Thompson
(1967) andVandeVen et al. (1976). For example, the Prisoners’Dilemma
game, in which group selection performed best, is a form of pooled task
interdependence (Thompson, 1967), whilst a second game in which
individual selection performed best resembles a form of serial task
interdependence. Another type of interdependence is reciprocal interde-
pendence in which the output of each worker is the input of the other.
Here,mutual cooperation dominates asDC andCDharm theperformance
of both parties and DD means nothing is done. In this situation group
and individual selection do equally well. The general form of the
problem investigated here is task interdependence (Van de Ven et al.,
1976) where interdependences exist between the tasks of all individuals
in a group.
These ﬁndings call into question the conventional wisdom and com-
mon practice in which work group formation and reward structures
favor rewarding the best performing individuals, or in other contexts,
rewarding the best performing individual ﬁrms in an industry, network
or region (Wilkinson, Mattsson, & Easton, 2000). The ﬁndings indicate
that managers (or policy makers) need to rethink and redesign group
tasks in order to change interdependencies as well as the design of
incentive systems. As Sutton (2007) notes, a focus exclusively on indi-
vidual incentives is likely to damage group functioning as this over-
rewards themost visible performers, under-rewards thosewho support
Table 2
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themand fails to include in themetrics the costs and damages associated
with favoring the top performers.
Second, the results provide support for previous empirical research.
For example, Libby and Thorne (2009) showed that group incentives
have no effect on production line tasks when little interaction takes
place, or, in other words when the interdependencies are very low
such that oneworker’s performance has little effect on another’s, there-
by aligning individual and group performance. Similarly, research has
shown that group cohesion and shared knowledge and cognitions,
which aid coordination processes, have a greater effect on group effec-
tiveness when the group task involves more complex work ﬂows,
which make group members more interdependent (Kozlowski & Ilgen,
Fig. 4.Best individual and best groupperformance for three interaction games+ across the space of selection and rewardmechanisms.*. *All results averaged over 14641 games for the best
individual and group performance in the ﬁnal generation of each simulation. The performancemeasure,α, ranging from 0.0 (individual based evaluation) to 1.0 (group based evaluation)
is given on the x-axis. The groupmixingmeasure,β, ranging from0.0 (random) to 1.0 (constant) is given on the y-axis. Lighter colours represent higher scores. +Games: Panels (a) and (b):
CC = 0.5, CD = 0.1, DC = 0.7, DD = 0.2. Panels (c) and (d): CC = 0.5, CD= 1.0, DC = 1.0, DD = 0.1. Panels (e) and (f): CC = 0.5, CD= 0.0, DC = 0.3, DD= 0.6.
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2006). Greater levels of interdependence create more opportunities
for conﬂicts of interests to arise and misalignment between individual
and group performance. In such situations group reward mechanisms
produce superior outcomes.
A counter intuitive result is that group evaluation and reward
systems not only produce superior group performance for most
games, they also produce the best performing individuals. This is
because the mix or ecology of strategies arising in a group supports
and sustains high performing individuals, whose strategies contribute
to higher overall group performance. Individual based systems select
high performing individuals and they becomemore frequent in groups.
This means they have to interact more with each other, leading to
interactions that tend to reduce their own, aswell as the group’s perfor-
mance. Referring to an earlier example, this is why individual selection
of hens laying themost eggs producedmean, aggressive hens and lower
overall performance compared to group selection (Muir, 1996). This
result conﬂicts with empirical research indicating that feedback focused
on team performance tends to yield better team performance at the
expense of individual performance (DeShon, Kozlowski, Schmidt,
Milner, & Wiechmann, 2004). This may be due to the type of group
task and interdependencies studied.
Third, the results show that for many types of iterated games no
signiﬁcant differences exist between the results for individual and
group selection. This result is valuable because the ﬁnding helps
managers to focus on work group situations in which the evaluation
and reward mechanism matters. The results show that they matter
when group and individual performance are not aligned. In practice,
determining the degree of alignment between individual and group
interests may be difﬁcult to determine. A variety of interaction effects
may co-exist in a group and change over time, such that individual
and group interests are sometimes but not always aligned. This suggests
the need for careful monitoring and varying of individual and group
incentives over time. The results provide some guidance in the analysis
and classiﬁcation of work group conditions and also indicate the types
of real world experiments required to test the effect of different incen-
tive systems, rather than having to do this for all types of conditions.
Fourth, the results provide new insights into the nature and effects
of free riders in groups, those who beneﬁt from the strategies of others
at the expense of group performance. Much research on cooperation in
groups has focused on the problem of free riders or social loafers
(Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). The types of cooperative strategies that
emerge and survive under group based incentive systems are difﬁcult
to exploit by free riders. This is because they have characteristics similar
to that of Tit-for-Tat, the winning strategy under individual selection
found by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). Individuals using this type of
strategy are nice in that they begin by cooperating and are not the
ﬁrst to defect; they aremore forgiving, quickly returning to cooperation
after a defection; and they are easy to recognize and understand. But
they are also provocable because they quickly respond to defection by
defecting themselves. While free riders may survive longer under
group selection at the expense of the group’s performance they will be
eliminated eventually because they compromise the performance of
groups in which they operate and such groups will be selected out.
In practice, other group members are likely to identify free riders
and punish them for their behavior because of their effect on group
performance.
Fifth, an important and novel result is identifying a new type of role
in groups, self-sacriﬁcers, which have important implications for group
design and reward systems. They are not the same as free riders, who
exploit group behavior at the expense of the group. Self-sacriﬁcers
help to improve group performance at their own expense and are
instrumental in producing superior group performance, even though
their individual performance is poor. This situation occurs when
mixed strategies, in other words DC and CD, lead to better group perfor-
mance rather does all Cs or all Ds. Here, the performancemay be strong-
ly asymmetricwith theDs looking like starworkers and the Cs like dogs.
But if self-sacriﬁcers are removed from the group, punished, learn to or
are forced to change their behavior, overall performance suffers because
the group is no longer able to co-produce the star performers. One
possible example that suggests itself is university departments and
the way performance is assessed and rewarded. Universities tend to
assess academic performance and rewards based on an individual’s
research publications. But an individual’s research output in part
depends on the behavior of others in the department, whose individual
research performance may be weak. These could be those willing and
able to take on more of the less attractive and poorly rewarded tasks,
such as additional administration and teaching, at the expense of their
own research and publications. Their behavior enables others to
become more research productive and the research performance of
the department as a whole improves. If rewards only go to research
stars and poor performers are not rewarded, or encouraged to leave,
the behavior of and types of people in the department changes. As a
result the stars make up more of the department but they then start
to compete with each other, which may damage each other’s research
performance and compromise teaching and administrative duties.
Overall levels of cooperation and morale in the department diminish,
which also eventually impacts on research, as well the ability of the
department to attract and retain potential stars. A better solution,
based the results described here, is including some rewards for the
department as a whole that help build a productive mix or ecology
of research, teaching and administration-focused academics that
co-produces, as well as retains research stars. One corollary of this
type of reasoning is that high performing research departments may
have more non or low performing researchers than others! This
would be an interesting proposition to test.
Several possible extensions of the computational approach used
here exist. These include varying the mix of games in a group, as well
as considering the effects of different types of interaction networks
within and between groups. In the model used here all the players
play the same iterated game. Future research could examine the effects
of differentmixes of games co-existing, especially in terms of the degree
of alignment of group and individual performance. Also, here players
play all the players in their group and none of those in other groups.
Future research could examine the effects of different networks of inter-
action and ones that change over time due to individuals choosing and
refusing who to interact with. Extensions such as these will enable the
modeling of more complex and nuanced group structures and even
the ability to mimic more closely particular examples of actual complex
work group situations.
Another extension is to examine the effects of usingways other than
genetic algorithms to model evaluation and reward systems. These
include modeling the processes in terms of the individual learning
and adaption mechanisms and social inﬂuence processes among
individuals.
This paper also presents an opportunity to design experiments,
both in laboratories and ﬁrms, that empirically test the implications
of this research. These results can help direct attention to the most
productive types of experiments to design; ones that focus on key
kinds of differences between work groups, such as the degree to
which individual and group performance are aligned. Further the re-
search results indicate that interactions among all members of a
group matter in determining performance. Yet most reported exper-
iments andmathematical models of the effects of incentives on work
groups and teams do not take into account these interdependencies
and the possibility of group effects. Experiments mix participants
randomly and do not allow participants to know the identity of
those they play against over time, see for example Kalra and Shi
(2001) and Lim et al. (2009). This allows many opportunities for fur-
ther research that include different types of interdependencies
among group members, that allow for changes in group composition
and patterns of interaction over time, the emergence of relationships
and cooperative behavior among group members and specialization.
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As indicated above, computational social science methods can help
in addressing many of these research issues.
To summarize, the research reported here provides valuable and
novel insights into the nature, role and impact of individual versus
group evaluation and reward systems on the behavior and performance
of work groups. The ﬁndings show that group based schemes produce
better performing groups and individuals in many situations and they
reveal the existence of a new type of role, the self-sacriﬁcer, who plays
a key role in improving the performance of the group as a whole at
their own expense. Such individuals do not emerge and remain when
individual based evaluation and reward systems operate. In addition,
the research demonstrates the potential value of a different type of
research methodology, computational social science, in which agent
based computer simulation models are used to model, in more realistic
ways than conventional linear models, key dimensions of work group
behavior. These models are subjected then to systematic experiments
examining the behavior of the model over time under different condi-
tions in order to determine their effects. The potential value of this
approach is not limited to the study of work groups, the approach can
be used to better model and understand the behavior all types of com-
plex nonlinear systems, including work group, teams, ﬁrms, industries,
business relations and networks, supply chains and whole economic
and market systems. As noted earlier, the potential value of computa-
tional social science methods are gaining increased attention in many
disciplines, including business related ones, such as management and
marketing. These methods open up many new opportunities for future
research.
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